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The Role of Risk in Determining Liberalizing Trade
Abstract
This paper seeks to extend the research done by Bates to the years 1985-’95 and ‘96-2001. Bates found that
increased terms-of-trade instability leads to decreased openness. He also found that terms-oftrade instability
led to a change in trade regimeii. This paper searches to see if these results have continued through 1995 in
order to secure more legitimacy as a leading theory among the risk literature of today. Over that time period,
the Soviet Union and the Apartheid regime broke down. These countries have experienced major political and
economic reforms due to these events, which should make these countries extremely vulnerable to risk. LDCs
were forced in the early 90s to open their borders without question in order to receive aide from
intercontinental organizations. It may no longer be the case that risk determines openness with these various
global shocks during the late 80s and early 90s, so this paper analyzes whether Bates’s empirical research on
terms-of-trade instability continues through these risky times.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Developing countries have seen themselvespulled by two contrasting views of develop-ment by leading experts.  Proponents of the
intervening, strong governments claim that govern-
ment intervention enhances openness among the
small economies of Western Europe to international
markets.  The other group emphasizes the lasses-faire
approach to government intervention citing experi-
ences among the less developed countries (LDCs) of
the Global South.  Political scientists generally hold
the former position
while most econo-
mists believe the lat-
ter.  These compet-
ing theories of
development were
not formally
addressed against
each other until
Batesi explicitly set
these two views on opposite sides and analyzed their
beliefs in contrast.  From these two opposing views
arises the role of risk in structuring institutional rela-
tionships with trade liberalization.
This paper seeks to extend the research done
by Bates to the years 1985-’95 and ‘96-2001.  Bates
found that increased terms-of-trade instability leads
to decreased openness.  He also found that terms-of-
trade instability led to a change in trade regimeii.
This paper searches to see if these results have con-
tinued through 1995 in order to secure more legitima-
cy as a leading theory among the risk literature of
today.  Over that time period, the Soviet Union and
the Apartheid regime broke down.  These countries
have experienced major political and economic
reforms due to these events, which should make these
countries extremely vulnerable to risk.  LDCs were
forced in the early 90s to open their borders without
question in order to receive aide from intercontinen-
tal organizations.  It may no longer be the case that
risk determines openness with these various global
shocks during the late 80s and early 90s, so this paper
analyzes whether Bates’s empirical research on
terms-of-trade instability continues through these
risky times.
II. FREE TRADE, INTERVENTION AND RISK
After an era of belief in government interven-
tion to cure
market failurei-
ii, development
e c o n o m i s t s
had become
proponents of
free trade in
solving eco-
nomic prob-
lems in LDCs.  The famed “Washington Consensus”
advocated an end to government intervention in ten
basic guidelines (Williamson, 1990).  LDCs were
told to end fiscal deficits, eliminate subsidies, imple-
ment a broad, moderate marginal tax rate, adopt com-
petitive exchange rates, eliminate tariffs, privatize,
deregulate, and enforce property rights.  This consen-
sus became increasingly popular when the World
Bank and IMF introduced these policies as necessi-
ties for receiving loans.  These policies became used
as a benchmark, and almost all LDCs bought into this
theory of development in order to receive aide.
While these policies were hailed as a consensus, they
were hardly anything of the sort.
Some economists were wary of how Eastern
European countries would switch from a closed econ-
omy to a market economy smoothly.  Placed in
between LDC and OECD countries by most econo-
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mists, these countries represent a fundamentally dif-
ferent way of thinking about development (Killick,
1991).  Unlike the Washington Consensus, Killick
advocates a slow transition is needed with steady cen-
trally planned economic policy by the government.
He points to both economic and social indicators as
needing the consensus of the population to withstand
a long, steady transition.  Policy-makers need to learn
the operations in state enterprises necessary for priva-
tizing and developing the private sector.
Some economists still do not see any logic in
heavy-handed intervention.  Bhagwati argues that
protection of “infant industries” is a second-best
attempt at fixing market failures.  He claims that pro-
tectionist policy should only be considered when
market distortions are caused by foreign rather than
domestic issues (1994).  Furthermore, market imper-
fections are minimal, and protectionist policy arises
because of a demand created from the incorrect per-
spective that
protectionism
will aid an
economy.  This
belief draws
from the theory
that interven-
tion will pro-
duce worse out-
comes than
allowing imper-
fect markets to
fix themselves. Bhagwati also believes that introduc-
ing government intervention will produce inefficien-
cies and corruption (Bhagwati, 1994).    This sort of
belief was held as a belief that growth solves devel-
opment.  Many economists cited Mexico as a prime
example of success using the Washington
Consensus’s free-trade approach.
On January 1, 1994, the Zapasta National
Liberation Army revolted against the Mexican gov-
ernment (Naim, 2000).  The revolt was unexpected
and drew attention to the possibility that successful
development may be more than just growth through
free trade.  This date marked when policy makers
were forced to consider what went wrong in Mexico’s
system after success had been found using solid,
macroeconomic policy.  Growth did not seem to mat-
ter to people if they were unable to go to hospitals
and get medicines they needed (Naim, 2000).
This sort of discovery led to a divergence of
laissez-faire belief in the open market policies.  Some
economists argued that three conditions were needed
for development: “a stable and credible policy envi-
ronment, an open and competitive economy, and a
focused public sector” (Stiglitz, 1995).  This sort of
government intervention and stable policy will pro-
tect against risk and allow a country to reap benefits
from international trade once they can insure against
external shocks.  Stiglitz points to the examples of the
East Asian Tigers, who did not have a highly central-
ized state, but broad policy packages in picking a spe-
cific industry to invest in will lead to economic and
holistic growth.  Stiglitz also claims that in the event
of corruption among the governments of the Tiger
countries, the benefits have far outweighed the costs.
Bhagwati’s response to this is that this theory is based
on an isolated observation in the realm of develop-
ment and that there is no solid theoretical framework
that supports the strategies of the Tigers (Naim,
2000)iv.  Stiglitz
points to the
provision of
public education
in South Korea,
which resulted
in gaining a 95%
literacy rate as
one of several
examples in
which the Tigers
used public sec-
tor provisions to increase quality of life that the mar-
ket would not have  (Stiglitz, 1998).
Other economists have joined Stiglitz’s
approach to development citing the protection of the
manufacturing sector to grant employment, skilled
job creation, and multiple other positive spill-over
effects while keeping the sector relatively protected
(Tybout, 2000).  Tybout claims that a protectionist
regime may be desired under certain socio-economic
conditions.  Although when trade liberalization is
established, efficiency levels will increase and
domestic producers will exploit economies of scale.
The discipline of development experiences a
back and forth discussion concerning the advocates
of free trade based on theory and the advocates for
some government intervention, who cite the Tigers.
The collapse of the Asian Tigers into the Asian
Debacle seems to show that their growth may not
have been as great as would have been hoped.  The
103The Park Place Economist, Volume XIII
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corruption that Bhagwati argues to eliminate while
Stiglitz says is worth the risk had a large role to play
in the Asian Debacle.  It is difficult to say whether the
benefit was worth the cost, but the experience of the
Tigers provides insight into a new way of thinking
about development economics.  However, overall, the
discipline of developmental economics stresses the
importance of allowing the market to determine the
state.  Though some economists differ on how much
control the state should exude in determining eco-
nomic policy, the market is considered the ultimate
determinance of growth and development (Bates,
1991).  An important part of development is to
remember that the goal is to attain the same status as
that of the developed nations of the West.  Many
scholars point to the examples of Western Europe and
the United States as a basis for determining what sort
of economic and social policies are most desirable for
attaining sustained development.  Developed coun-
tries such as these have the political institutions pre-
pared to respond against foreign shocks to insure
against risk.
The litera-
ture in political
science points to
the importance of
political interven-
tion and political
institutions in
d e v e l o p m e n t .
Katzenstein claims that (Katzenstein, 1983) “the
experience of the small European states suggests that
political intervention… does not constrain, but com-
plements international liberalization.”  In his earlier
work, Katzenstein points to 3 international effects
from the experience of the West: interpenetration,
interdependece, and interconnection (Katzenstein,
1976).  All of the countries of the West were seen to
have very similar political bodies on the most gener-
al level focusing on competitive political systems.
The interpenetration of these societies forces a trade-
based relationship between countries, which results
in the interdependence of states.  Political importance
rests in the bureaucracies’ ability to implement policy
responses to changes in international relations.  Once
interdependece is established, states become vulnera-
ble and depend on each other to continue thriving in
this interwoven, global economy.  The interconnec-
tion of states through technological revolution in
transportation and communication leaves states and
societies sensitive to the new decisions and activities
of other states and societies.  The policies other states
use within this system of interconnection becomes a
standard for the state to uphold at the same level or
above the level of states with which they have con-
stant contact.  This informal, political bond helps
insure against external shocks through long-standing,
consistent, interwoven relationships.  Through
Katzenstein’s analysis of the activities in the West, a
strong claim arises that a bureaucratic policy between
interwoven states drives the level and ability of trade
to exist freely between states (Katzenstein, 1976).
Given the importance of bureaucratic institu-
tions as discussed above, the question arises of how
much power the state should have over international
trade relations.  Fukuyama (2004) explores the role
that state strength and scope play in development.  He
points to the US political institutions, which created a
state with small scope but a sufficient amount of
strength within its scope.  This combination of scope
and state was born from the American Revolution’s
revolt against
state authority.
Contrasting with
the experience
of France,
France has a
state with a large
scope and a
large amount of
strength.  Fukuyama argues that a strong state is more
important than a large scope.  This allows for both the
development of France and the United States to be
explained well in how they were able to develop and
globalize successfully.  This explains the post-com-
munist countries’ failures to succeed at economic
reforms.  Development economists argued vehement-
ly for the immediate privatization of old government
institutions.  The scope and strength of the state was
so diminished in those countries that privatization
became an enormous disaster due to asymmetric
information without any governmental agency strong
enough to correct these market failures.  Even Milton
Friedman noted that his demand of the Eastern
European states to privatize was his mistake.  He was
able to see that the rule of law was more basic than
privatizationv (Fukuyama, 2004).
The literature on the economies of the West
explores the internal, political basis for maintaining
open trade regimes (Bates, 1991).  Some develop-
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ment economists advocate open markets to shape
government, while some political scientists advocate
the state should shape economic policy and trade.
Arising from the depths of this debate is the literature
concerning the impact of risk on the structuring of
institutions.
Bates cites Oliver Williamson as the founder
of this theory concerning risk and the availability of
instruments for dealing with risk as they shape the
structure of non-market institutions (Williamson,
1985)vi.  Williamson analyzed the role of the firm,
law, lineages and households, contracts, and govern-
ment agencies with respect to risk.  Since
Williamson, the literature on risk has become much
more developed and discussed among economists
and political scientists as an important role in devel-
oping countries.
Rodrik found in his analysis of trade liberal-
ization that a posi-
tive association
between trade
exposure and
scope of govern-
ment exists,
where many
would assume a
negative correla-
tion between the two (Rodrik, 1998).  He finds that
government spending provides social insurance in
economies that are vulnerable to external shock
through free trade.  Rodrik finds the interaction
between volatility in terms of trade and product con-
centration of exports is highly significant with trade
openness in his analysis.  He cites Bates’s article,
declaring “public spending is a risk-reducing instru-
ment on which there is greater reliance in more open
economies” (Rodrik, 1998).  In Rodrik’s study, he
found that measures of external risk are strongly cor-
related with terms-of-trade risk.  He believes that
government consumption is unstable and forces
trade-liberalized countries to cover all sources of risk,
including terms of trade.  Rodrik tells us that external
risk is largely determined by terms-of-trade risk, but
how much risk will a country accept given that gov-
ernment consumption must try to stabilize risk?
Countries can be classified into three types of
categories: risk averse, risk loving, and risk neutral
(Adsera, 2002).  Building on Williamson’s assump-
tion that a state must be able to insure against risk,
Adsera views a state’s attitude toward whether it has
the ability to insure against risk.  The risk loving state
will always benefit from free trade and is therefore
able to insure against external shocks or is willing to
weather external shocks.  Since a highly negative
external shock could cause social unrest, it is reason-
able to assume that risk-loving states have the welfare
systems in place that will insure against these shocks.
Risk averse states will always suffer from free trade
because of inability to cope with external shocks.
Risk neutral states sometimes win and sometimes
lose in free trade, so it is difficult to say how they will
respond.  In a given election, the people of a country
must choose between candidates who will maximize
their social benefit.  Adsera shows that the risk loving
state will choose trade liberalization, while the risk
averse state will choose a protectionist regime.
Adsera argues that unless a state has the resources to
insure against risk, the state will implement tariffs in
order to gain
funds to build the
institutions nec-
essary for insur-
ing against risk
(Adsera, 2002).
Applying
this argument to
the literature on
Western development and LDC development, the
strength of state appears a powerful part of the devel-
opment puzzle.  Without the ability to levy and col-
lect taxes, having a strong export economy, or imple-
ment tariffs to gain funds, there is no way for a gov-
ernment to have the strength to insure against macro-
economic risk in a free-trade society.  Therefore,
strength of state, as defined by Fukuyama and
Katzenstein, is crucial in enabling trade openness to
be a suitable economic policy.  If a state is weak, it
will be forced to fall into protectionist policies to
keep its people employed, or face the possibility of
revolt and social unrest, such as seen in Mexico in
1994 (Naim, 2000).  A weak state will shift towards
autarky until their tariffs are high enough to offset the
risk of collapse due to external macroeconomic
volatility in terms-of-trade.  Fukuyama’s theory on
the lack of importance in scope of state, due to the US
example, runs contrary to Rodrik’s empirical study
on scope of state.  It may be the case that the US is a
sort of anomaly in the Western countries, which
would imply that strength and scope of state normal-
ly follow each other hand in hand.  Considering either
105The Park Place Economist, Volume XIII
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strength or scope of state, the literature on risk seems
to agree with the literature on the Western countries
that the ability to insure against risk through a strong
state will lead a country to enjoy success through free
trade.
Some development economists are now strug-
gling to discover what method of development is best
for the LDCs.  It is clear that the Washington
Consensus has not been as successful has hoped, but
economists are working on solutions to this problem.
Bhagwati’s theories are sound; however, they do not
take political or social factors into account and look
towards the long run benefit of the state as a whole.
Therefore, economic methods of easing the process
have been proposed through Killick’s belief that a
gradual process is required in order to enable the
smooth transition from a state of autarky to liberal-
ized trading policy.  Tybout seems to be returning to
the belief that a “big push” will aid developing
nations to establish institutions quicker than they
would have if simply liberalizing trade from the
beginning.  The literature on risk shows us how the
economic theory and political realities mesh together
into methods to insure against risk.  A big push
towards creating solid governmental institutions will
enable free trade with the mechanisms in place need-
ed to insure against volatility in terms-of-trade.  Once
LDCs have the ability to insure against risk, they will
be able to engage in free trade more openly.
These arguments draw back to Bates’s argu-
ment that the international economic environment
allows opportunities for gains from trade along with
exposing danger to risk.  This results in higher levels
of terms-of-trade risk facing a country and increases
in trade barriers. If social insurance programs in a
country are sufficient, the government will likely
decrease the barriers to free trade.  His analysis of tar-
iff protection and domestic transfers allow a common
theoretical basis for the different bodies of literature
to reconcile their competing views (Bates, 1991).
III. RISK VARIABLES
The hypothesis that arises from the literature
on risk is that an increase in instability in terms of
trade will decrease the level of trade openness in a
given country.  Bates, Adsera, and Rodrik have found
this in studies similar to this one.  The question
regarding the work of Bates is whether his specific
findings will stand up to the newer era of internation-
al trade policy.  With countries being forced to open
their borders to trade in order to gain aide from the
World Bank and IMF under the Washington
Consensus, it is entirely possible that countries with
high levels of instability in terms of trade are being
forced to keep their borders open when they would
normally not.  This study will also look at other vari-
ables that may affect trade openness or risk.
With respect to Bates’s use of variables, this
paper will use the same variables and how they were
operationalized.  The dependent variable in this study
is ‘trade openness.’ Openness is used as the loga-
rithm of exports plus imports divided by gross nation-
al product in US dollars multiplied by 100.  Data for
the time period 1985-1995 is collected from the
World Development Indicatorsvii.  Bates used anoth-
er dependent variable ‘trade policy’ to see if there
was an empirical way of measuring why countries
chose to pursue a trade orientation of strongly
inward, moderately inward, moderately outward, or
strongly outward.  Unfortunately, there was no way to
update this source, so the variable ‘trade policy’ was
unusable in this studyviii.
The independent variables Bates uses are
income, ‘instability’, ‘population’, ‘revenues collect-
ed’, and ‘transfer payments’.  These variables are
operationalized in the way Bates had done.  Income
is measured by taking the logarithm of per capita
GDP in US dollars.  Instability is taken by the loga-
rithm of the measure of instability in terms of tradeix.
Population is used by the logarithm of population in
tens of millions.  Revenue collected is measured by
the logarithm of per capita revenues collected from
sources other than trade measured in millions of US
dollars.  Transfer Payments are measured as the log-
arithm Transfer Payments as a percentage of total
expenditures. In addition to the independent variables
used by Bates, this paper introduces the independent
variable ‘tariffs’ and ‘government consumption’.
Tariffs are operationalized by taking the logarithm of
tariffs collected is a percentage of government expen-
diture.  All of these independent variables will use the
source: World Development Indicators.
The question to ask when running the analy-
sis is, will an increase in the dependent variable have
a positive, or a negative correlation?  From the work
of Bates, the expected signs are explicitly drawn out
from his empirical work for the prior decades.  Bates
found that Instability, Population, and Income had
negative correlations with Trade Openness.  Higher
levels of instability means that the government does
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not have the capabilities to insure against external
shock, so the higher the instability, the less likely
trade liberalization is to occur.  Bates found that
Revenue and Transfer Payments had positive correla-
tions with Trade Openness.  This is logical because
they enable the government to insure against risk.
Tariffs should have a negative correlation with Trade
Openness because tariffs make international trade
more expensive to conduct.
From these variables arises 2 models, the first
one explicitly used by Bates and the second one
including the two variables Bates used against trade
policy with the introduction of the variable Tariffs
from this study.  See the Appendix for the explicit
layout of the models.
When all of the data was finally collected,
only 38 countries had enough data to test in the orig-
inal model used by Bates, but only 28 countries had
enough data to run the second model used in this
paper.  The low N value means that the regression is
likely to yield a low significance.  This is a problem
to keep in mind when reading how significant the val-
ues are in this study. See Appendix Table 1 for coun-
tries used.
IV. RESULTS
In order to obtain a better picture of the world,
descriptive statistics were run to find what the world
averages were for the different variables when data
was available.  The average level of trade openness
was 74% of GDP, the average level of instability was
8.4, the average income was $6,123 per capita, the
average tariff level was 13.4% of revenue, average
transfer payments were 33% of the current account,
average population was 26.9 million people, and the
average non-tariff revenue per capita was $2,569.
The standard deviations for each variable were large,
so not too much can be told from just the means of
these independent variables and how they will affect
trade openness.  For full descriptive statistics, see
Table 1.
The next step taken to determine if there was
a high correlation between any of the variables and
trade openness was to run a bivariate analysis of the
data.  The analysis used the versions of the variables
after taking the natural log of the variables.  The three
variables with significance at the .01 level to trade
openness were the same three that Bates used in his
analysis of trade openness: instability, income, and
population.  Their respective correlations were -.489,
+.227, and -.707 (For full bivariate analysis, see
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TABLE 1 
Means and Standard 
Deviations of the Variables  
Variable  Mean  Stand Dev.  
Avg. Open       74.6  43.3 
TOT Inst.  8.36  7 
Avg. Inc.   $6,123   9187 
Avg. Tariff  13.40%  13.5 
Avg. TRPA 33.60%  20.4 
Avg. Pop. 26.9 mill.   104.8 mill.  
Avg. Rev. $2,569   3520 
 
TABLE 2 
Correlations to the Natural Log of 
Trade Openness  
Variable Correlation  Significance  N  
Ln Instability  -0.489  0.002 39  
Ln Income 0.227  0.009 130  
Ln Tariff -0.026  0.837 63  
Ln TRPA -0.163  0.203 63  
Ln Population  -0.707  0 133  
Ln Revenue 0.216  0.089 63  
TABLE 3 
Regression of Bates’s Model  
Variable Beta Coef.  Significance  T-Statistic 
Constant 10.341 0 12.715 
Ln Instability  -0.463 0 -4.716 
Ln Income -0.12 0.011 -2.68 
Ln Population  -0.27 0 -8.245 
 
TABLE 4 
Full Regression Model  
Against Trade Openness  
Variable 
Beta 
Coef. Significance T-Statistic 
Constant 11.079 0 11.108 
Ln Instability  -0.224 0.067 -1.929 
Ln Income -0.474 0.046 -2.122 
Ln Population  -0.255 0 -6.592 
Ln TRPA -0.129 0.28 -0.16 
Ln Revenue 0.301 0.173 1.412 
Ln Tariff -0.047 0.125 -1.596 
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Table 2).  Tariffs, transfer payments, and revenue
were not significantly correlated; however, the corre-
sponding signs were as predicted for all but transfer
payments.  Transfer payments had a correlation of -
.163 with a significance of .203.  The incorrectly pre-
dicted sign may be because of a lack of data, so it is
difficult to determine what this result means.
The bivariate analysis came out slightly dif-
ferent than expected.  In the analysis done by Bates,
he found income to have a negative, but very small
correlation with trade openness.  The divergence here
from the work done by Bates demands that the issue
be pushed on to a further analysis of the data.
The regression model using Bates’s empirical
model came out both robust and significant when
using the logged versions of population, instability,
and income against trade openness (Table 3).  The
R^2 was .743 with a significance of .000 and a stan-
dard error of .323.  Instability had a coefficient of -
.463 and a significance of .000, making it the most
robust of the variables in determining trade openness.
Population had a -.270 coefficient and a significance
of .000.  So population and instability both were sig-
nificant and negative, in accordance with the research
done by Bates.  While the bivariate analysis showed
a positive correlation for income to openness, the
regression came out with the predicted sign.  Income
had a coefficient of -.120 and a significance of .011.
The change in coefficient may be due to the sample
size decreasing from 130 to 38, however it does seem
strange that this correlation would flip from one
analysis to another.  This is a strange phenomenon
with a small significance that should be researched
further.  Seeing that the model used by Bates proved
both significant statistically and substantively, anoth-
er regression was run to see if the addition of the
three other variables would help in determining trade
openness.
The second regression drew a better line than
the first regression, but was not as significant.  The
introduction of the logged values of transfer pay-
ments, tariffs, and revenue dropped the sample size
from 38 to 27, which would account for some of the
lost significance.  The line itself had an R^2 of .817,
a significance of .000, and a standard error of .252
(Table 4).  These significant and robust numbers
show that the variables introduced added greater
understanding to why countries are more open.
Unfortunately, the significance each independent
variable was not very good.
In this analysis, all of the variables came out
with their expected sign except transfer payments.
Instability had a coefficient of -.224 and a signifi-
cance of .067, income a -.474 and a .046, population
a -.255 and a .000, transfer payments a -.129 and a
.280, revenue a +.301 and a .173, and tariffs a -.047
and a .125.  The three variables used in the first analy-
sis were the most significant and retained their signs.
Transfer payments were the least significant and it is
hard to say whether the coefficient is worth consider-
ing.  Revenue and tariffs, however, have the correct
sign and a bad, but not too bad significance consider-
ing the small sample size.  These two variables
should be studied when more data is available to see
if they are significant determinants in trade openness.
If this is the case, they are two variables that are eas-
ily controlled by the government and can be manipu-
lated to suit the macroeconomic goals of the state.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUS-
SION
The hypothesis originated by Bates that the
level of instability in terms of trade is a large factor in
determining the level of trade openness in a country
proves to remain an important factor.  The correlation
and the regression coefficient were both significant
and substantial.  One of the surprising findings from
this analysis was the positive coefficient in income in
the bivariate analysis and first regression as opposed
to Bates’s negative coefficient.  Population had an
extremely large coefficient in the negative direction,
which supported the findings of Bates.
It appears as if the role of risk is even more
important from ’85-’95 than in the prior two decades.
The coefficient is stronger (-.463) than the -.163 (’63-
’73) and -.287 from (’74-’84).  The reason for this
shift may be due to the small dataset, but a change in
strength of coefficient needs to be researched further.
Data on terms of trade needs to be gathered better in
order to see why this increase in correlation has
occurred.  The lack of data on terms of trade instabil-
ity limited the sample size greatly, so until more data
is collected on this variable, it will be difficult to ana-
lyze why the coefficients vary so greatly in these 3
time periods.  Either way, lowering instability in
terms of trade proves to be one of the most control-
lable, efficient ways to control how open a country
will be to trade.
Population was much more substantial than
expected in correlation with openness.  This may be
Sean Moran
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because larger populations have larger GDP, and will
have a lower amount of trade internationally because
of the ability to produce more domestically.  If more
goods can be produced within the country’s border,
then they do not need to trade internationally.  This
may account for the large coefficient in population
against openness.
Tariffs did not have a significant correlation
with trade openness in the bivariate analysis.  This
does not seem logical since high tariffs should lead to
foreign goods being more expensive.  One would
expect tariffs to be significantly negative in compari-
son to trade openness.  The sign is in the correct
direction, but the correlation is both weak and not
significant.  This may be a sign that the way tariffs
affect trade openness is changing and will need fur-
ther research.
The most troublesome part of this paper was
the lack of data.  Bates had used a variable called
“trade policy” for many tests he ran in his study.  He
ran analysis of every independent variable against
trade policy and found significant and substantial
results.  Unfortunately, the data he used to determine
trade orientation for the two time periods has not
been updated and was unavailable for this study.  If
the World Bank would update this data, then a great
deal would be added to this study.
APPENDIX
Bates’s Model:
Lopen = a1 + a2*(Linst) + a3*(Lpop) + a4*(Linc)
2nd Model:  
Lopen = a1 + a2*(Linst) + a3*(Lpop) + a4*(Linc)
+ a5*(Lrev) + a6*(Ltrpa) + a7*(Ltarif)
i Bates’s 1991 article is the basis for this paper.  It follows his
structure of three bodies of literature: first is the view of devel-
opment economists, second is the view of western developed
countries, and third is the literature concerning risk.
ii Bates uses the World Bank classification of nation’s econom-
ic policy from the World Development Report: 1987.  I am
unable to find an updated version of this that would be usable
for this project, so the variable “trade policy” will need to be
dropped.
iii Developmental economists originally claimed that the infant
industries needed a “big push” in order to propel the economy
into legitimate competition with other countries.  Some policies
used were import-substitution, over or under valued exchange
rates, and protective tariffs.
iv In Naim’s article, he depicts the violent dissent among mem-
bers of the IMF and World Bank in dealing with what sorts of
policies are best for a development strategy.  Bhagwati joins in
and decides that Stiglitz’s plan is “plain ignorance.”
v Fukuyama cites an interview he had with Milton Friedman,
“the dean of orthodox free-market economists” in 2001 concern-
ing the failed privatization of the Eastern European states.  
vi Bates cites Williamson as the founder of the
“Williamsonesque” perspective of risk, which is the perspective
he continues with in this paper.  
vii This is a dataset published by the World Bank available on
CD-Rom on the 2nd floor of the Ames Library.
viii Bates used ‘trade policy’ from the 1987 World Development
Report.  Unfortunately, after searching through all of the later
versions of this book, the table was never updated.  World Bank
data was unavailable for finding an updated source for this and
so the variable was dropped from the analysis.
ix Bates found the instability in terms of trade from the formu-
la TOTt = a1 + a2 (TOTt-1) + u.  The ‘u’ value is the standard
error of the estimate using this regression model.  This value
measures the terms of trade instability for a given country over
the terms of trade instablity for a given country over the 11-
year period.
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